Quaid-i-Azam and Pakistan’s Relations with Neighbouring Countries

Iqtidar Karamat Cheema

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a peace loving person and wanted Pakistan to be a peace loving state with neutral and independent foreign policy. Despite her best efforts and wishes Pakistan did not have friendly relations with Afghanistan, the only country which opposed her entry into the United Nations. At the time of her establishment, the Afghan Government urged the tribes on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line to rise and create an independent ‘Pakhtunistan’. It also tried to win over their sympathies through all kinds of methods and propaganda. In this respect she was given full backing by India which wanted to divert tribal interests from Kashmir,and cripple Pakistan from within.

Pakistan was confronted with the security problems in the North-West also where Afghanistan had made Government, anticipating that the British would have to relinquish power in India, made the representation to London that the people of those areas of North West Frontier which had been annexed to India during the last century should be offered option of becoming independent or rejoining Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Government was pressing for the acceptance of its demands when in 1946 the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, which was an ally of Indian National Congress, raised the slogan of ‘Pakhtunistan’ The slogan then ‘signified’ and negation or demand for the independence of the Pathans of the North-West Frontier – Independence that is, from Pakistan, should such a state come into being”. The Partition Plan provided that a referendum would be held in the North-West Frontier Province to accertain whether the population of the area wanted to join Pakistan or India. The British Government rejected the Red Shirt proposal that there should be an option for independence in the referendum as per coordination of 3 June 1947 plan.

The referendum was held in the NWFP in July 1947 without the requested addition of independence as an option for the Pashtuns. Out of the total electorate of 572,798 the valid votes cast for union with Pakistan were 289,244 while the 2,074 were for union with India. The NWFP became a part of Pakistan, on the basis of the referendum. The frontier States of Swat, Chitral, Dir and Amb also acceded to Pakistan, and the Tribal Jirgas of the frontier region opted for “attachment of the Tribal Agencies to Pakistan”. Afghanistan did not accept this arrangement whereas the British had to proceed to the Pakistan plan agreed to between the British, Indian National Congress and All-India Muslim League. As follow up of the referendum the Quaid as Pakistan’s first Governor-General sacked Dr. Khan Sahib’s Ministry in the NWFP in the first week after the independence.

Afghanistan’s non-recognition of the NWFP and the Tribal Agencies as part of Pakistan coupled with the fact that Afghanistan was the only state that cast a negative vote on Pakistan’s application for membership to the UN in September 1947, caused a sense of deep resentment in Karachi. In November 1947, Najibullah Khan, special envoy of King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, made three demands on Pakistan: “creation of a free sovereign province’ comprising the tribal region; establishment of corridor areas of West Baluchistan to give Afghanistan an access to the sea or, alternatively, granting a ‘free Afghan Zone’ in Karachi, and conclusion of a Pakistan Afghanistan treaty specifically providing that either party could remain neutral in case the other party was attacked. The hopes raised by Karachi talks of an amicable settlement of the Pakistan-Afghanistan differences proved to be unfounded.

The Afghan Government, therefore, showed hostility to Pakistan right from the very beginning. Despite all this Quaid-i-Azam made every endeavor to establish friendly relation with the Afghan Government. He stationed his personal representative at Kabulwhose office was later on converted into the Pak-Embassy. Replying to the speech by Sardar Najibullah Khan, Special Representative of the Afghan King in Pakistan at the time of presenting his credentials on 3rd December, 1947, the Quaid-remarked. “The government and the people of Pakistan entertain nothing but feelings of warmest friendship towards the Muslim Kingdom of Afghanistan which is our closest neighbor and with whom for many centuries and for many generations the people of Pakistan have had countless religious, cultural and social ties. It is doubtless known to your Excellency that the people of Pakistan have always admired the spirit of independence of the Afghan nation and its great strength of character….And I hope that the two governments will soon be able to settle and adjust, in a spirit of goodwill for the benefit of both, all those matters which require our immediate attention….I assure you on behalf of my Government and myself that we shall extend every assistance, cooperation and goodwill to you”. He reiterated the same desire in his reply to the speech by the Afghan Ambassador on the occasion of presentation of his credentials on 8th May, 1948 in the following words:

“The age-old links which bind our two people will be further strengthened thus paving the way for a bright and a happy future for both our countries….Your Royal Highness can rest assured that in striving to cement the bonds of friendship that already exist between our two people, and my Government will give you all possible help and cooperation”.

The Afghan Government, however, did not respond to these professions of friendship and Islamic brotherhood and refused to give up her hostile attitude. But Pakistan refrained herself from retaliating and exhibited remarkable forbearance despite grave provocations on part of the Afghan Government.

Though not an immediate neighbor, Ceylon occupies a strategic position as regard providing port facilities along the lines of sea communications between East and West Pakistan. Relations between Pakistan and Ceylon were quite friendly and harmonious. On the occasion of Ceylon’s achievements of Dominion status, Quaid-i-Azam sent on 4th February, 1948 the following message of felicitations to the Ceylon Government:

“Pakistan has the warmest goodwill towards Ceylon, and I am sanguine that the good feeling which exists between our two people will be further strengthened as the years roll by and our common interests and mutual and reciprocal handling of them, will bring us into still closer friendship”

Pakistan established friendly relations with Burma as well. Immediately after Burma’s independence, Muslims of the Arakan region revolted and expressed their desire to join Pakistan. Quaid-i-Azam, however, strongly discouraged them and urged them to stay on and remain faithful to their won country. In order to show his sincere wishes to the Burmese Government, he also did not take advantage of the situation to settle the border dispute which had arisen because of the ever changing course of the river Naffe.

Replying to the speech by the Burnease Ambassador on the occasion of presentation of his credentials on 21st January, 1948, Quaid-i-Azam observed,

“The leaders and the people of Burma are also no strangers to us as in the Past history had brought our destinies together. With the great changes that took place on 15th August, 1947, geography has also brought our future closely together as the border of your Excellency’s great country are contiguous for hundreds of miles with the borders of Pakistan…. I have no doubt that as in the past, in future also the many bonds that exist between the union of Burma and Pakistan will be strengthened to the mutual advantage of both countries….I am glad to note that during your short term of office as high Commissioner in Pakistan, you have received every assistance from Pakistan. I have no doubt that in the future also good relations will continue and I assure you of our cooperation with your Government.

The history of Indo-Pakistan relations is bleak, sensitive and crucial. The nature of relations is more complex and could be critical. The troubled Indo-Pakistan relations are the real obstacle in developing a shared South Asian perspective and sense of regional community. The roots of Pakistan’s distrust and fear of India can be traced back to the pre-independence period when the Congress party and the Muslim League pleaded for two diametrically opposed nationalism. Mutual distrust intensified as the two states entangled in problems in the immediate aftermath of independence in 1947.

South Asia’s gravest discord and an ugliest unsolved problem has been the constant bad relations between India and Pakistan. It is most tragic that India and Pakistan have looked upon one another as enemies since their independence, and that their relations with each other are charged with an envenomed load of bigotry, prejudice, religious and nationalistic hostility. There had been lack of cooperation between India and Pakistan in political, economic and financial matters, and not only lack of cooperation in many instances, their policies have tended to aggravate mutual difficulties. As a scholar has observed: “The relations between India and Pakistan since the partition of 1947 have been characterized by extreme tensions much of the time, tension all of the time, economic blockade on one occasion….periodic threats of war and continuous ideological and political warfare which have produced, to put it mildly, a shambles in the relationship between these two countries”.

After the acceptance of the partition plan, the Quaid expressed the new India his friendly feelings and desire for full cooperation. The Quaid-i-Azam in an interview with a Swiss Journalist himself offered to enter into arrangements for joint defence with India. Speaking at Delhi on May 21, he said that “Pakistan would be in friendly and reciprocal alliance with India. He advocated friendly relations in the mutual interest of both – “both is why I have been urging that we separate in a friendly way and remain friends thereafter.’ Jinnah concluded: “I do envisage an  alliance, pact or treaty between Pakistan and Hindustan in the mutual interest of both and against any aggressive outsider. On August 15, 1947, as the first Governor-General of Pakistan, he declared “We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial relations with our immediate neighbors and with the world at large”. In his message to Hindustan the Quaid said,

“The past must be buried and let us start afresh as two independent sovereign states of Hindus and Pakistan, I wish Hindus prosperity and peace”.

But the joy and enthusiasm were short lived as the tragic events immediately before and after independence made good relations between the two countries almost impossible. The communal murder and mass migration gave them the worst possible start. Complaining against the communal murder and massacre of India, the Quaid-i-Azam said, “The systematic massacre of defenceless and innocent people puts to shame even the most heinous atrocities committed by the worst tyrants known to history. We have been the victims of a deeply-laid and well-planned conspiracy executed with other disregard of the elementary principles of honesty, chivalry and honor”. Liaquat Ali Khan declared that Pakistan was surrounded on all sides by forces which were out to destroy her.

Many Indians feel that their acceptance of the partition plan and the creation of Pakistan was tragic mistake which might still be corrected. An Indian writer has put it bluntly.

Basically if the Portuguese possession of Goa is a threat to India, Pakistan is a far greater threat to India and wise diplomacy cannot overlook or ignore this fundamental fact of paramount importance”.

Soon after the partition it became apparent that the Indian leaders had never really reconciled themselves to the creation of Pakistan. They have indicated on many occasions that partition is merely a temporary division, and hopes have often been expressed in India that receding areas would beg for reunion. Sardar Petal, in a message on the first day of independence said that: “Let not our brethren across the border feel that they are neglected or forgotten. Their welfare will claim our vigilance and we shall follow with abiding interest their future in full hope and confidence that sooner than later we shal again be united in common allegiance to our country”. The Congress President, Acharya Kripalani said on independence day, “Let us henceforth bend all our emergencies to the unification of this land of ours”.

Temporary nature of the partition and unreality of the separation was also suggested by Pandit Nehru in his Independence Day message:

“We think also of our brothers and sisters who have been out off from us by political boundaries and who unhappily cannot share at present in the freedom that has come. They are of us and will remain of us what ever may happen and we shall be sharers in their good and ill fortune alike”.

Even Gandhi observed:

“That the Muslim and the Hindus are inter-dependent on one another. We cannot get along with each other. The Muslim League will ask to come back to Hindustan. They will ask Jawaharlal to come back and he will take them back”.

Such views have continued to be expressed from time to time. In September, 1948, a Minister to Bihar Government said,

“The territories that total constitute the domination of Pakistan are and would continue to remain the integral parts of India in spite of the partition. The division is temporary and I feel sure that a day will come sooner or later when Pakistan will become a part of India”.

With this assumption – collapse of Pakistan and ultimate reunion with India – the Hindu Congress launched a vigorous campaign for liquidation of Pakistan and undoing the partition. India policies were calculated to stifle the new State. The Anglo-Hindu alliance had designated a plan to concede Pakistan on such terms and conditions as would, humanly speaking, prevent the new state from consolidating itself as an independent entity and eventually force its merger with India under pressure of overwhelming circumstances. This is evident from the hope expressed by two of the most powerful leaders of the congress. Sardar Patel in a letter to a member of the congress working Committee said, “A strong Centre with the whole of India – except East Bengal and part of the Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan – enjoying full autonomy under the Centre, will be so powerful that the remaining portions will eventually come in”. Mr. Nehru nursed the same hope. He said, “The truth is that we were tried men and we were getting on in years too… the plan for partition offered a way out and we took it. But if Gandhi had told us not to, we would have gone on fighting and waiting. But we accepted. We expected that partition would be temporary, that Pakistan was bound to come back to us”. However, the leaders of India accepted partition in the hope of undoing it soon and establishing their hegemony over the whole sub-continent. Michael Brecher wrote, “Most of the Congress leaders and Nehru among them, subscribed to the view that Pakistan was not viable state – politically, economically, geographically or militarily – and that sooner or later the  areas which had seceded would be compelled by force of circumstances to return to the fold”.

The natural result of this attitude of Indian Leaders was that many Pakistani had real fears about India’s ultimate aim to reuniting the sub-continent. “Pakistan does feel” says Professor Quincy Wright, ‘that India has its eye out for re-annexation of Pakistan

This, of course, was a challenge to the honor and courage of Quaid-i-Azam and his nation, and both accepted it.

The following is the text of Quaid-i-Azam’s interview with the Reuter’s correspondent. Mr. Duncan Hooper which he gave on October 25, 1947. Pakistan: “Pakistan has come to stay and will stay. But we are always ready to come to an understanding or enter into agreements with Hindustan as two independent, equal, sovereign states. Just as we may have our alliances, friendship and agreements with any other foreign nation. But all this propaganda and agitation, all the threats that are held out even by prominent congress speakers, against our full independent sovereign state are not likely to restore goodwill and friendly relations between the two states. We must try to stop any effort or attempt which is intended to bring about a forced union of the two dominions.

In answer to the question about the basis for friendly relations between the dominion of India and Pakistan, the governor-General of Pakistan replied:

“First and foremost, both dominions must make all out efforts to restore peace and maintain law and order in their respective States – that is fundamental. I have repeatedly said that; now that the division of India has been brought about the solemn agreement between the two Dominions, we should bury the past and resolve that, despite all that has happened, we shall remain friends. There are many things which we need from each other as neighbors and we can help each other in diverse ways, morally, materially and politically and thereby raise the prestige and status of both dominions”.

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah in an interview given to a Swiss Journalist on March 11, 1948, in answer to the question whether there is any hope of India and Pakistan coming to a peaceful settlement of their own with regard to their differences and disputes on very vital and important matters, said:

“Yes, provided the Indian Government will shed the superiority complex and will deal with Pakistan on an equal footing and fully appreciate the realities”.

To the quest on whether in international affairs Pakistan and India will work jointly and also join hands for the defence of their border – both land and sea and cooperate against any outside aggression, the first Governor-General of Pakistan replied:

“Personally I have no doubt in my mind that our own paramount interest demands that the dominion of Pakistan and the dominion of India should coordinate for the purpose of playing their part in international affairs and the developments that may take place and also it is of vital important to Pakistan and India as independent sovereign states to collaborate in a friendly way jointly to defend their frontiers both on land and sea against any aggression. But this depends entirely on whether Pakistan and India can resolve their own differences, if we can put our house in order internally, then we may be able to play a very great part externally in all international affairs”. 

Just as the propaganda for ending the partition and finishing off Pakistan persistent, so that Quaid-i-Azam in his strong warning to the Indian leaders said, “If firm and friendly relations are to be established between the two dominions, this sort of propaganda must stop. As for the two nation theory, it is not a theory but a fact. The division of India is based on that fact….How than can it be said that there is one nation”?

Communal murder on a scale unprecedented in the modern history of India began in August 1947. The occasion of independence was marred by large-scale butchery of Muslim men, women and children – which sharpened passions on both sides to a new edge of bitterness. It was nothing less than a war of extermination against the Muslim minority of East Punjab and in a number of adjoining princely states. Within a period of six or seven weeks between 1st August to September 20, 1947 nearly half a million Muslims were killed. Then the communal murder spread to Delhi, the tragic drama of mass Muslim killing in Delhi – the city which, for centuries was the nursery of Muslim culture in India – lasted for the whole of September 1947. It was an integral part of a deeply-laid conspiracy for the extermination of the Muslims. The Sinister aspect of the Indian conspiracy to cripple Pakistan was “to overwhelm it with a torrent of uprooted and tormented refugees driven out of India, before it had time even to set up a regular administrative machinery”. M.H. Sayyid wrote,

“There could be no more effective weapon of strangling it into economic subjugation than to put before it the gigantic problem of rehabilitating a mass of displaced humanity with harrowing tales of atrocity across the border”There were reprisals in Pakistan areas also. This was very unfortunate and could be fatal to the newly born state. The Quaid-i-Azam, however, urged upon the people of Pakistan to bring  about communal harmony and mutual trust”

The Quaid-i-Azam was deeply distressed by the sufferings of his people, but he was a man of peace and he urged Muslims not to retaliate against the Hindus. He said, “Let the actions of others not guide our actions. That is the spirit of Islam”. The Quaid-i-Azam appealed to Muslims in Pakistan not to seek revenge reminding them that: “Those who unwisely think that they can undo Pakistan are sadly mistaken. Nothing on earth now will succeed in touching Pakistan, whose roots are now truly and deeply laid. And such dream of feeling on their part which leads them to indulge in killing will only end in increasing toll of innocent lives, and they are only tarnishing the fair name of the communities to which they belong. The civilized world will look upon their inhuman conduct with horror”.

The account of Lord Ismay as given to Jinnah, was a balanced and fair one. Ismay wrote: ‘Delhi itself was on the verge of chaos. Muslims were systematically hunted down and butchered”. Jinnah asked him: ‘How could any civilized government permit such a state of affairs? Even Lord Mountbatten had confessed that ‘whereas in Karachi there have been very few incidents, in Delhi there has been almost complete dislocation.

It is, however, true that a result of the massacre of Muslims in India, there was violent reaction in West Pakistan. This reaction in west Punjab to what had happened in East Punjab was deplorable and to be condemned, and Jinnah himself denounced it in the strongest terms. He urged the Muslims to secure the ‘protection of minorities as a sacred undertaking, in accordance with the teachings of Islam”. 

The result of the Punjab massacre was the flight of millions in both directions. Many refugees suffered indescribable horrors, relatives and friends mercilessly slaughtered, women folk outraged, trains derailed, ancestral homes and property looted and abandoned. These tragic happenings however, profoundly affected, relations between the two countries in the early years of independence.

The communal upheaval in 1947-48 assumed such dimensions as to necessitate joint and concerted action to put them down on August 16, 1947, the two Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India decided to make a joint tour of the riot affected areas of the Punjab and on 17th August, 1947, they issued a joint appeal to their countrymen to restore peace and protect the lives of minorities. This was preceded by a conference of the Prime ministers, ministers and high officials of all Government concerned, Central and Provincial at Lahore on 3rd September, 1947, in which concerted measures, to be adopted in order to quell the disturbances, were unanimously agreed upon. But cooperation between the two governments was not satisfactory, the mutual suspicions and hostilities continued to the relations between the two countries.

When the matter finally reached the United Nations in January, 1948, the Quaid-i-Azam’s government complained ‘While this vast scheme of genocide was being put into execution in East Punjab and neighboring ares, the Pakistan Government made repeated efforts to persuade the Union of India to arrest its course. A number of conferences were held between the two Dominions almost invariably at the instance of the Pakistan, but while lip service was paid to the necessity of restoring order, no serious effort was made by the Indian government to implement their promises. The tragic outbreaks of communal violence in India and Pakistan had involved the two governments in embittered controversy in which lurked the seeds of open conflict. On September 21, 1947, however, they issued a joint statement which was encouraging and heartening. It said, “Any conception of a conflict between India and Pakistan is repugnant not only on moral grounds but because any such conflict will result in disaster for both. The two governments will therefore, work to the utmost of their capacity to remove the cause of conflict”. But the fate of minorities continued to be uncertain and they were subjected to all sorts of brutality and inhuman treatment on the part of India.

Serious complaints about the atrocities against the refugees continued to be made. Early in November 1947, a special train carrying about 5000 refugees from karalia Camp in Ambala (East Punjab) arrived at Gojjra (Lyallpur, west Punjab); 2000 of them were found sick and 85 percent were suffering from dysentery. About 100 persons had already died on the journey. This aroused suspicion and a sample of atta (wheat flour) that had been supplied to the refugees at karalia Camp was sent for chemical analysis/ it was found that it contained powdered copper Sulphate – an irritant poison. The government of West Punjab protested to the government of East Punjab about the poisonous food supplied to the refugees, and asked for a joint enquiry and investigation – but without any result.

The problem of minorities could not, however, be solved, says Altaf Gauhar. Since the Punjab massacre of 1947 – 1948, India and Pakistan have looked upon each other as enemies. A million people who became victims of violence, rape and arson were not easily going to be forgotten. The 10 million Indian Muslims were forcibly evicted across the border into Pakistan to shatter its economy. They brought with them memories of great injustice, sufferings and oppression. South Asia’s gravest discord and an ugliest unsolved problem – the strained relations between India and Pakistan – began to manifest itself with the mass-killings and migration of 1947.

The problem of evacuee properly had its origin in the great trek that followed the communal carnage. This issue embittered the Indo-Pakistan relations to a great extent. The Indian sources put the number of Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Pakistan at nearly five million and from East Pakistan at nearly four million. The Pakistan Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation placed the number of Muslim Refugees to West Pakistan at 7,900,000. This is the greatest recorded movement of mankind has ever witnessed. These refugees left behind their vast immoveable properly. Their movable properly was either lost or destroyed to a great extent and not much of what remained could be carried by the early migrants to their new homes. Repeated attempts made to resolve this issue ended invariably in frustrating failures.

The evacuee properly issue was first discussed on 29th August, 1947 at a meeting of the joint defence council of India and Pakistan an official communiqué was issued on 30th August, 1947. The central idea behind the joint action was to restore the properties to their rightful owner after the internal situation has been stabilized to ensure the return of the migrant from the places of refuge to their home countries and to appoint a custodian in each country to protect such properties against misappropriation. But surprisingly, the East Punjab Government somehow allowed the Hindu and Sikh migrants to take possession of Muslim Property left in India. The Quaid-i-Azam’s retaliated because the pressure of immigration on Pakistan was no less severe than on India and Pakistan with her backward economy could ill-afford the luxury of keeping the properties of Hindus and Sikhs under custody for their ultimate return while millions of refugees were pouring in from across.

However, the representatives of India and Pakistan agreed at a conference held in Lahore on 5th October, 1947 that both Governments should consider questions regarding the treatment of the property of the evacuees and make proposals with the object of framing a common policy. But the Indian Government did not attack much importance to this undertaking and, with the passage of time, drafted legislations to defeat the very purpose for which negotiations were being carried on ever the evacuee property issue.

The first inter-dominion Conference held 18-20 December 1970. In this conference it was agreed that each Dominion should furnish its own scheme for the disposal of the evacuee properly, both movable and immovable to a joint committee of officials, not later than 5 January, 1948 in order to arrive at an agreed solution.

The joint official Committee Scheduled to be held on 5th January, 1948 met at Lahore on 22nd March and took view of the changed situation out of these discussion emerged a formula on the following lines:

With the regard to the agricultural property, the general principle agreed upon was as follows: The Dominion in which the avacuee agricultural properly was situated should acquire it on a fair price except that part thereof in respect of which the Government concerned had accorded permission to exchange or tell by private treaty or had allowed restoration. A joint Valuation Board was to be set up to assess the value of the  agricultural property. It was agreed that with regard to this property, there should be an inter-Government deal, the debtor Dominion paying the creditor Dominion the difference in value.    

While admitting the rights of the provincial Governments or requisite urban immovable property on payment to fair compensation to be determined by a joint Government Agency, the Committee agreed that the owners should be given complete freedom to sell or exchange such property in any way they preferred. To supplement individual effort. The two governments were advised to set up a joint Government Agency for Sales and Exchanges:

To ensure further that owners of the urban immovable property should continue to receive rent from the property until sales or exchanges could be arranged, the official committee recommended that a joint urban assessment Board be established.

With regard to movable property, the principle agreed upon left the owners free to take possession of such property and then to dispose it of freely, should they so decide, either personally or through Government liaison officers of personal agents, except where such property was requisitioned by the provincial Governments. In the latter contingency, a provision was made for compensation.

The Quaid-i-Azam’s Government signified its readiness to implement the proposals of the joint officials committee, but it took four months for the Ministers of the two Governments to consider it. Before the conference took place another was hastily arranged to consider the situation of East Pakistan.

The Second Inter-Dominion Conference was held on 15-18 April, 1948. Until the end of 1947, the two-way migration was confined more or less to the Punjab. But following the widespread communal rioting in west Bengal, more serious phase of exodus started. A conference at Ministerial level was accordingly held at Calcutta from 15th April to 18th April, 1948. The decision reached with regard to the evacuee properly in East and West Bengal ran on the following lines:

It was agreed that the Governments of East and West Bengal would provide for legislation with a view to setting up evacuee properly management Boards in districts from which a substantial exodus had taken place.

On 22nd July, 1948 the third inter-Dominion Conference at Ministerial level took place in Lahore to discuss the recommendations of the joint official committee which had earlier submitted an agreed report at the end of March. Pakistan opened the basic question about the method of settlement that special revenue officers should be appointed by both the dominations and that copying of revenue records should start forthwith. Pakistan further suggested that a special revenue officers should be appointed by both the dominions and that  copying of revenue records should start forthwith. Pakistan further suggested that a special joint committee should be set up to supervise and expedite the whole work. But the Indian Government employed dilatory tactics in exchanging records of agricultural property and she never allowed the joint urban Assessment Board to be set up. Instead of returning the movable property to their owners, as envisaged by the agreement, the Indian government started, taking over movable property without paying any compensation. Thus the settlement of the issue of the evacuee property was again postponed.

Another source of bitter friction between India and Pakistan arose from the division of the assets of the former government of undivided India. As soon as British authority was withdrawn the Indian disregarded solemn obligations which they had freely incurred…what mattered to them, above all else, was to cripple and thwart the establishment of Pakistan as a viable independent state. When partition was agreed upon the far great part of the assets and resources of British India remained the physical possession of the new Indian Government and it started to deprive Pakistan of her legitimate share. Ian Stephens writes: “In the division of assets, India started with the advantage of having most of them in her physical possession and she dishonestly retained much of Pakistan’s share. Pakistan suffered greatly under the mechanism for the division of the country’s assets, particularly military stores and equipments. In spite of repeated representations from the Quaid-i-Azam government, India never gave her sister Dominion its due share of the partition assets. This constituted one of the earliest causes of tension between the two nations.

The cash balance of former governments of undivided India on August 14, 1947 stood at about four thousand million rupees as her share. This was not agreed to by India, and the matter, therefore, was referred to the Arbitration Tribunal which had been set up to settle any differences that might crop up between India and Pakistan over the process of partition. In December 1947, however, the two governments arrived at a financial agreement under which Pakistan’s share was fixed at 750 million rupees. Altaf Gauhar writes, “India paid Rs. 200 million of these and held up the remaining, declaring that their payment would depend on the settlement on the Kashmir issue”. The Pakistan Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammad, who led his country’s delegation to the financial talk during a press conference held at Karachi on 8th January, 1948, stated: “At no stage of the discussions which led to the signing of the Agreement, was the question of Kashmir ever mentioned or considered. If it had been, Pakistan would never have been a party to the agreement”. Yet Sardar Patel declared at a press conference on January 12, 1948: ‘India cannot reasonably be asked to make payment of cash balance when an armed conflict with its forces is in progress’, and he indicated that the Kashmir dispute would be ‘likely to destroy the whole basis of the financial agreement”. The Indian Government instructed the Reserve Bank of India not to credit the government of Pakistan with the 550 million rupees of the cash balance which were due to her under the financial agreement. This produced sharp reaction and resentment in Pakistan, where it was described ‘not only as an unfriendly act, but also as an act of aggression”. Ghulam Mohammad denounced India’s action as ‘one of pressure politics and blackmail’. He appealed to international opinion to judge how the big brother – India – is treating the infant state of Pakistan. Pakistan had to carry the dispute to the Security Council and maintained on 15th January, 1948, that India’s interference with the reserve bank of India, was designed to destroy the monetary and currency fabric of Pakistan, which had not yet set up her own State bank. Before, the matter could advance in the Security Council, Pakistan’s permanent representative in the U.N. Sir Zafarullah Kan informed the Council on May 7, 1948 that since Pakistan was setting up her own State Bank with effect from 1st July 1948, his government did not wish to proceed further in the matter.

Quaid-i-Azam’s government accused India of putting pressure on the Reserve Bank not to fulfill its obligations. Quaid-i-Azam’s Government pointed out that money under cash balance did not belong to India in any sense; it was Pakistan’s property. It was no gift or aid from India which could be problem . However, the action of the government of India in linking the payment of cash balances with the Kashmir, put Indo-Pakistan relations under further strain and deterioration. Thus, under these unfavourable circumstances the Governor-General of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam decided to establish an independent Central bank for Pakistan. At the time of the opening ceremony of State Bank, he said, “The opening of the State Bank of Pakistan symbolizes the sovereignty of our state in the financial sphere”.

At the time of partition, a joint Defence Council was set up to supervise the division of the armed forces and military stores. It was an impartial organization under the Supreme Commander, Auchinleck, for ensuring fair division of military equipment. It was estimated that the Supreme commander would be able to complete this task by March 31, 1948. But, within a very short time after the transfer of power, India was bent on abolishing this instrument for impartial distribution of military equipment, finding it a great hindrance to her plans for depriving Pakistan of any military stores or equipment in order to keep her militarily weak. Soon, great pressure was brought to bear on Auchinleck to recommend to the British Government to abolish his headquarters long before he had completed his task, Just as India insisted on the Liquidation of the Supreme Command on 30th November, the Quaid-i-Azam Government pleaded for its continued function until April 1, 1948, the date originally laid down in the Joint Defence council order of 11th August, 1947 to ensure fair division and reconstitution which according to her, was yet to be accomplished. In view of this difference between the two countries, Aunchinleck proposed, first, that the  supreme command should be liquidated on 31st December, 1947, but Sardar Patel at once began putting on pressure for an earlier closing down of the Supreme Command. Therefore, on November 7, the British government stated that “They had reluctantly come to the conclusion that they had no option but to close down the Supreme Command Headquarters on November 30, 1947”.

The ultimate winding up of this impartial organisation in November 1947, instead of on 1st April, 1948, gave India a free hand to withhold supply to Pakistan of her share of military stores. The delivery of Pakistan’s due share of military equipment, ordnance stores and telegraph stores were withheld. No laboratory equipment testing equipment, carrier terminals and repeaters, had so far been released by India despite the repetition of the Quaid-i-Azam’s Government’s protest. This was a matter which caused a good deal of irritation and friction and which produced but feelings between the two Government. “Pakistan was entitled to a share of 160 train loads of military stores. Very little of this did actually come, and several of the trains that came were loaded with bricks and stones”. This affected Pakistan’s defence, with the result that Quaid-i-Azam’s government had to enter into a military defence pact with the United States.

In view of the economic difference between India and Pakistan, the commonsense solution of these difference was, some sort of arrangement under which Pakistan would supply raw jute, cotton, hides and food grains to India, receiving from her neighbor cloth, iron and steel, coal, jute manufactured paper etc. The facts of history and geography dictated that the economic of the two countries would not be separated. The ideal situation would have been a custom union with free trade, the Governor-General of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, addressing the general meeting of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce, said I can assure you on behalf of the government of Pakistan that it is their intention and policy to let the Channels of free trading flow as freely as possible”. He also said, “…..any delusion or reusion from which some people still suffer, let me make it clear, that the sooner they bring their notion Pakistan surrendering to India or seeking Union with central Government…. The better it will be for peace and prosperity of both the Dominions and will help a great deal to establish goodwill and neighbourly good feelings”.

In 1947, the Quaid-i-Azam’s government made a proposal to India under which Pakistan would supply and India would manufacture jute and cotton on the basis of sharing the export duties and the foreign exchange earnings. But India was not willing to enter into such an arrangement. When the question of apportionment of the revenue on jute was discussed by the joint Export committee, India insisted on the retention by each country of the revenue collected as its own parts: a principle which would have given Pakistan less than 20 percent of the jute duty, though producing 28 percent of the raw jute. Quaid-i-Azam’s government could not possibly agree to such conditions.

Further, despite the standstill agreement between the two countries in 1947, under which goods moving from one country to another would be exempt from customs duty. India imposed custom duty on jute manufactures exported to Pakistan. The Quaid-i-Azam’s government also took reciprocal actions to counter India’s move. Since then Indo-Pakistan relations have never been free from the strains and stresses of the political disputes, which bedevil the relations between the two countries. The two countries were already engaged in a ‘limited war’ over Kashmir, and it is no wonder that the trade and commerce should be affected by it. In East Pakistan, heaps of jute bales sat in Dacca unable to be shipped to the jute mills of Calcutta. Jute was between the two countries, each side raising its demands and duties against the other, led to a complete economic break between east and West Bengal.

Since partition, the Indus waters had raised bitter feelings between the two countries. The Indus and its five tributaries (the rivers Jehlum, Chenab, Ravi, Bias and Sutlaj) supply the largest irrigation system in the world, at the time of independence. Normally, after division of the Punjab, India, which, as a result of a peculiar reaches of the rivers, should have respected. Pakistan’s right to the use of their water. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, Chairman of the Punjab Boundary Commission. Justifiably expected that “Any agreement as to sharing of water from those canals or otherwise will be respected by whatever government hereafter assumes jurisdiction over the headworks concerned”.

The Arbitral Tribunal, was of the view that “There is no question of varying the authorized shares of water to which the two zones and the various canals are entitled”. But, as in other matters, India had ugly designs against Pakistan in this respect also. The division of the Punjab made Pakistan downstream riparian, the headworks of several canals having been left in the Indian territory. Pakistan was thus made dependent on her bigger neighbors goodwill, and on such international law on these matters as existed for regular flow of water to the plots cultivated by millions of her peasants. India’s seizure of the value of Kashmir in the autumn of 1947 woresened things, potentially at least, by putting the upstream reaches of the Chenab and Jhelum also in her control; and in April 1948, she displaying her power for wreaking disaster on Pakistan agriculture by shutting off for several weeks, all water-supplies to the rich lands around Lahore. It was precarious situation for Quaid-i-Azam’s government which had “to resort to a quick interim solution for the restoration of the with-held supplies”. Faced with the grim prospect of the disruption of millions of acres of fertile land, the Quaid-i-Azam’s government was forced to sign a document with India in which she agreed to India’s progressively diminishing water supplies to these and to West Punjab’s government tapping alternative resources”.

The Quaid-i-Azam’s government criticized the Indian action, of the withheld supplies, as an attempt to strangle her. In some ways, Indo-Pakistan dispute about the Indus-basin water was given graver than that about Kashmir, because thousands of cultivators were faced with starvation. It involved the possibility that splendidly fertile great tracts of West Pakistan would be reconverted to desert and its industrious cultivators made beggars.

The Indian independence plan of 1947 provided that, after the lapse of paramountey, the princely states of India were free to decide to which of the two dominions they should accede. This position has throughout been accepted by the government of Pakistan both in theory and practice, as the cornerstone of its policy with regard to states. In a statement on 17th June, 1947,the Quaid-i-Azam declared: “Constitutionally and legally, the Indian states will be independent sovereign states on the termination of paramountey and they will be free to decide for themselves to adopt any course they like; it is open to them to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, or decide to remain independent.

Again, after Lord Mountbatten had made a persuasive appeal to the States on 25th July, imploring them to join one or the other before 15th August, 1947, Quaid-i-Azam re-assured them on 31st July that Pakistan would respect their independence. The future Governor-General of Pakistan said,

“The Muslim League recognizes the right of each state to choose its destiny. It has no intention of coercing any state into adopting any particular course of action”.

As regards the States, the position was explained as follows by Lord Mountbatten in his address to the Chamber of Princes on 25th July, 1947. “You cannot run away from the Dominion Government which is your neighbor any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible”,was his pointed advice, but he added that ‘while deciding about accession certain geographical compulsions were to be reckoned with. Earlier in June he had advised the Maharaja of Kashmir that, before acceding to one of the dominions, he should ascertain the wishes of the people. The Viceroy’s advice can be summed up in three terms: geographical compulsion, wishes of the people, and the inevitable accession.

Practically, most of the princely states decided to accede either to India or Pakistan before 15th August, 1947, excepting the three state of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir, whose peoples and rulers had conflicting viewpoints about accession. All of them fell victim to Indian aggression.

Junagadh acceded to Pakistan on September 13, 1947. When the Ruler of junagadh signed the instrument of Accession with Pakistan, no exception to it was taken by the people of the state. On the 22nd September, 1947, however, the Governor-General of India telegraphed to the Governor-General of Pakistan saying that Pakistan’s acceptance of the accession of Junagadh, which had a Muslim ruler but a predominantly Hindu population, was an encroachment on Indian sovereignty and a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of India. He further said that this action on the part of Pakistan government was in utter violation of the principles on which partition was agreed upon and affected. But India vehemently denied the applicability of this argument to her own acceptance of the accession of Kashmir and simultaneous with the formal protests, the government of India took steps to solve the Junagadh problem by other means. Junagadh was surrounded by Indian troops. Economic blockade of Junagadh was imposed Rail communications with India were cut off. In consequence, Junagadh’s source of revenues from customs and railways dwindled, and there was a serious shortage of food. A provisional government of Junadagh with Gandhi’s newphew, Shamaldas, as President was set up with headquarters in Bombay. The “provisional government” shifted its headquarter to Rajkot, nearer Junagadh, recruited volunteers and organized raids into Junagadh.

The government of India was, however, bent on settling the matter by force. The blockade and raids had created such chaotic conditions in Junagadh by the end of October 1947 that the Nawab felt compelled to leave for Karachi with his family. On November 1, 1947, Indian forces occupied Badariawad and Mangrol. It took India another week to occupy Junagadh. On November 11, Pakistan lodged a strong complained with India to the effect that accession once made was irreversible. In consultation with Quaid-i-Azam, Liaquat Ali Khan, as Prime Minister of Pakistan, sent a telegram to the government of India on 11th November protesting against its occupation of Junagadh. Liaquat termed it as breach of International law, and he demanded on behalf of Pakistan that Indian troops forthwith leave Junagadh territory and the government of the State be returned to the Nawab, who was the rightful and constitutional ruler of the State.

On January 15, 1948, Quaid-i-Azam’s Government carried the dispute to the Security Council and requested the Security council to intervene in the matter. Quaid-i-Azam’s government desired that the then Government of Junagadh ‘should be replaced by an administration under the direction of a person nominated by the Secretary General of the United Nations”The Quaid-i-Azam’s Government also desired that ‘an impartial plebiscite should be held under the auspices of the United Nations to decide the accession of Junagadh to either Pakistan or India.

It would be seen that right from the beginning, the Quaid-i-Azam government pursued a peaceful policy despite persistent provocations by India. This as the policy that Pakistan persued in all her international relations including Kashmir.

The case of Hyderabad was different. It did not accede to Pakistan, but its Muslim ruler, with 16.50 million people of whom 86.50 percent were Hindu, decided to remain independent and offered to conclude treaties with India and Pakistan on all matters of common concern. He declared to hold a referendum in the presence of United Nation’s observers to ascertain the will of his people regarding the future of the state, but the Government of India took the stand that the State should first accede to India and then a plebiscite should be held to ascertain the wishes of the people; very much like Hitler’s proposal for a referendum in Austria after its occupation by Garman troops.

Having failed to browbeat the Nizam into complete accession, the Government of India endeavored to obtain at least “The substance of accession” as it would involve some loss of face for the government of India vis-à-vis other states but that would be offset by Hyderabad being committed not to accede to Pakistan. The Muslim population of Hyderabad was being subjected to severe Hindu persecution in an ever increasing manner with the passing of each day, due to infiltration of trained personnel with arms and ammunition into the State from across its borders contiguous with the provinces of Madras and Bombay. The situation that faced the Muslims was grave, and in order to protect their lives, honour and property, the Ittehad-ul-Muslimen, under the leadership of Kasim Rizvi, organized themselves for the purpose. It was obvious that the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen was against accession to India and wanted Hyderabad to continue to be an independent state.

By October, 1947 the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen had become a very popular and powerful force in expressing the views of the people and to protect their legitimate interests. At the end of November, 1947, Mir Laik Ali, a Leading Muslim industrialist of Hyderabad, became Prime Minister with the help of Kasim Razvi and his party, although the Quaid-i-Azam on being consulted by the Nizam had advised against the appointment. The attitude of Quaid-i-Azam’s Government towards Hyderabad in its difficulties with India was one of sympathy, but it was felt that the decision as to its precise relationship with India must be left to the judgment of the Nizam and his government.

In the meantime depredations of Indians into Hyderabad State continued unabated: and murder looting and arson of Muslim property became the order of the day. The Nizam was compelled under the force of circumstances to sign an Interim Standstill Agreement on 29th November, 1947 with India. Under this Agreement, India appointed K.M. Munshi as its Agent-general in Hyderabad, and from that day onward the internal difficulties of the Government of Hyderabad increased a hundredfold, and the anti-Muslim campaign within the State developed into a general conflagration. Hindus of the State were trying to strangulate the economic life of the state. When some government of India securities held by the State were transferred to Pakistan, Mir Laik Ali was summoned to Delhi on 2nd March, and Mountbatten advised him to “arrange with the government of Pakistan not to encash the securities advanced by Hyderabad during the currency of the Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad”, and that if this could be done, then “A fresh chapter in the Indo-Hyderabad relations would open”.

From Delhi Mir Laik Ali flew to Karachi, to discuss matters personally with the Quaid-i-Azam, he needed sound constitutional, legal and political advice and the Quaid was so much interested in development in Hyderabad, a stronghold of Muslims in South India. When Laik Ali explained to the Quaid-i-Azam difficulties of Hyderabad with India over the securities advanced to Pakistan, “He (Quaid-i-Azam) said that anything could be done to bring about a better understanding and build up a lasting and satisfactory relationship between India and Pakistan, he would be only too glad to undertake….And said no consideration whatsoever would be allowed to jeopardize the interests of Hyderabad”.

However, when allegations were made that Hyderabad had violated the standstill agreement, the Government of India tried to undermine the authority of the Nizam’s Government by inciting the Hindus. The Nizam was asked to ban the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen and to disband the Razakars, or volunteers. In a speech in Bombay on April 26, 1948, Nehru said, “if the safety of the people in Hyderabad was endangered by the activities of the Razakars the Government of India would intervene in Hyderabad State”. However, war was threatened. At last the Junagadh prescription was used. Hyderabad State was branded as a “land of looting, arson and murder”. In short every kind of pressure was brought to bear on the Nizam by the Government of India to force him to accede to India. Mountbatten and the other Indian leaders believed that the entire Hindu population in Hyderabad was for accession to India. They stressed time and against that the issue of Hyderabad should be left to the people to decide. In August, 1948, Mountbatten had written to the Nizam offering “a referendum under the supervision of British officers but the Nizam had not agreed”. The Indian reaction was immediate and drastic. On September 13, 1948, less than two days after the death of Quaid-i-Azam the Indian armed forces launched an attack and the Indian government occupied the Hyderabad State by force.

Indo-Pakistan relations since 1947 have pivoted mainly on the issue of Kashmir. After the announcement of the partition plan, the Indian leader tried to convince the Kashmir ruler for the accession of Kashmir to India. The Indian government was determined to get Kashmir even by using force against Pakistan. Pandit Nehru stated on 26th September, 1947,

“If Pakistan Government persistently refused to see its error and continued to minimize it, the Indian Government will have to go for war against it”. However, there were rumors in the State that the Maharaja would acceeede Kashmir to India, but the majority of the populations of Kashmir was in favour of accession to Pakistan. The Maharaja himself was aware of this fact, but he proved to be more loyal to Indian than to his own people.

The history of cultural ties between Pakistan and Kashmir is as old as the history of India itself. Kashmir has 902 miles long border with Pakistan and with India 317 miles only. The three main rivers of West Pakistan – the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab – have their sources in Kashmir. The means of all communication of Kashmir open towards Pakistan. The overwhelming Muslim character of its population, the continued and intimate association which binds its people to Pakistan from time immemorial, link Kashmir with Pakistan. Thus, on the occasion of partition, the geotraphic, economic, cultural ties and the state’s predominant Muslim population and other links demanded that it should accede to Pakistan. But the Maharaja’s personal interests and those of the ruling Hindu elite demanded accession to India.

The Maharaja was aware that this was not an easy task; he knew that 80 percent of the population of the state ardently desired accession to Pakistan. The Maharaja played the trick of entering into a standstill Agreement with Pakistan on August 15, 1947 with no intention to abide by it a minute longer than suited his purpose.

The trouble in Kashmir began in August 1947, when the Hindu Maharaja, Sir Hari Singh, started applying the same techniques of extermination to the Muslim population as were being launched in East Punjab and princely states of Kapurthala, Faridkot, Patiala, Alwar and Gwaliar. On August 26, 1947, the State troops opened fire on a meeting held by the Muslims at Bagh in Poonch District and killed many of them. Another similar incident took place at Nila Bat. The State troops then started burning whole villages in order to punish the Muslims. In September 1947, the genocide of the Muslim of the State started on an unprecedented scale. The Dogras carried on an orgy of loot, murder and arson in Poonch and other regions of the State.

Conditions having taken a serious turn, hundreds of Muslim men, women and aged person were compelled to leave their ancestral homeland. According to the special correspondent of the London Times of October 10, 1947, “In Jammu 237,000 Muslims were systematically exterminated unless they escaped to Pakistan along the border by all the forces of the Dogra state headed by Maharaja in person”. In Stephens wrote:

“within a period of about of about eleven weeks starting in August, systematic savageries, similar to those already launched in East Punjab and in Patiala and Kapurthala, practically eliminated the entire Muslim element in the population, amounting to 500,000 people. About 200000 just disappeared, remaining untraceable, having presumably been butchered, or died from epidemics or exposure. The rest fled destitude to West Punjab”.

These events aroused strong feeling throughout Pakistan, particularly in the border areas where thousands of wounded and maimed refugees took shelter. It was, therefore, only natural that their Kinsmen as well as their brethren from the tribal areas hastened across the border in an endeavor to save over three millions of their Muslims brethren.

By the middle of October, the Poonch revolt started receiving unofficial support from their friends in Pakistan from whom they were separated only by the river Jehlum. On October 15, 1947, the Maharaja wired to the Governor-General of Pakistan suggesting an impartial inquiry, adding this rather ominous warning: “If, unfortunately, this request is not headed, the government much against its wishes will have no option but to ask for assistance to withstand the aggressive and unfriendly actions of the Pakistan people along our border”. The reference was obviously to assistance from India. It was a clear pointer that Indian plans for a military occupation of Kashmir at the invitation of the Maharajas Government had reached a point where they could be openly avowed. The Quaid-i-Azam’s Government, not withstanding the provocative terms of the proposal, accepted, but the Maharaja government did not even reply when asked to nominate its representative to the ‘impartial inquirty’. Three days later, on October 18, another telegram came from the Prime Minister of Kashmir, this time to the Quaid-i-Azam, repeating all the previous allegations and again threatening to seek outside assistance. It was evident that a pretext for Indian military intervention in Kashmir was being sought. The Quaid-i-Azam in his telegraphic reply, on October 20, requested the Maharaja to send the Prime Minister of Kashmir to Karachi for discussions in order to smooth out difficulties and adjust matters in a friendly way. The Quaid-i-Azam stated: “The threat to enlist outside assistance shown clearly that the real aim of your Government’s policy is to seek an opportunity to join the Inidan Dominion, as a coupd’ etat, by securing the intervention and assistance of that Dominion. This policy is naturally creating deep resentment and grave apprehension among your subjects, 85 percent of whom are Muslims. The proposal made by my Government for meeting with your accredited representative is now an urgent necessity”.

No reply was sent by the Maharaja to this telegram despite a reminder by the Quaid-i-Azam. On 26th October, 1947, the Maharaja, who had already hatched a conspiracy with India, applied to India for accession and sought military aid to crush the Muslim uprising. The government of India hastened to accept the so-called accession, and under the plea of protecting the state against external aggression”. Immediately dispatched armed forces to occupy the greater part of the State. A big army was stationed for suppressing the democratic aspirations of the people of the State and establishing a military regime there. However, India’s action in regard to Kashmir was just negation of the principle which the Government of India claimed to follow. This accession was not justified from any point of view. But the Indian Government took a new stand in the case of Kashmir. Here she laid emphasis on the declaration of the Maharaja then on the importance of public opinion.

The fraudulently sough accession of State to India and its forced occupation by the Indian troops were acts of grave provocations. But Quaid-i-Azam’s government decided to meet provocation with conciliation. Immediately after the occupation of Kashmir by the Indian army, a conference between the Governor-General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan and India was arranged in Lahore at the instance of Jinnah; but it could not be held owing to Nehru’s illness and Sardar Patel’s reluctance to talk with the Pakistani leaders. A meeting at last took place between Jinnah and Mountbatten on November 1, 1947 at Lahore. Jinnah put forward a three-point proposal for the settlement of the dispute:

Lord Mountbatten pleaded his inability to accept the proposals without the consent of the Indian cabinet. These proposals were however, brushed aside by India. There were at least three more attempts by the Government of Pakistan for a settlement of the issue by negotiation. Each attempt was flatly rejected by the Indian Government, which seemed to rely on the physical might of its armed forces.

The turn of events in Kashmir had an adverse effect on the Quaid-i-Azam’s health. At the time of partition he had been confident of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan because of its Muslim population and geographical situation. “Kashmir”, he would say, “will fall into our lap like a ripe fruit”. Now he felt deceived, and his earlier optimism gave way to a deep disappointment. “We have been put on the wrong bus”, he remarked.

In January 1948, the Kashmir dispute was brought before the Security Council. It has been before the Security Council ever since problems come and problems go, but the Kashmir dispute seems to go on for ever. However the Quaid was sure that the Kashmir question would be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State and Maharaja Hari Singh would settle the accession issue by means of referendum. The Quaid-i-Azam supported the Kashmiris right to self-determination.

The long series of grave and disturbing developments preceding and immediately following the emergence of Pakistan, were certain to cast their ominous shadow on the future relations between the two countries. Had India formally accepted Pakistan as a living reality from the core of its heart the tensions between the Muslims and the Hindus of South Asia would have been buried in 1947. It was desired by the Quaid, who was keenly interested in strengthening human relations between the people of both countries. Had the Quaid’s dream of cooperation between Pak-India relations been materialized, the region would never been a scene of conflicts.

Reference:     Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as Governor-General of Pakistan
Author:           Iqtidar Karamat Cheema
Publisher:       Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Lahore. 2006

Notes and Reference

  1. Richard Symond, The Making of Pakistan, p. 167.
  2. Ian Stephens, Pakistan, p. 265.
  3. Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afganistan: An Insider’s Account, Washington, 1988, p. 67.
  4. Ibid., p. 68.
  5. Mahboob A Propatia, Pakistan’s Relations with the Soviet Union 1947-49: Constraints and Compulsions, Karachi 1988, p. 27.
  6. Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, p. 23.
  7. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-48, Karachi: Ferozsons Ltd., pp. 38-39.
  8. Ibid., p. 142-43.    
  9. The Pakistan Times, February 12, 1948.
  10. Arif Hussain, Pakistan: its Ideology and Foreign Policy, p. 89.
  11. Khurshid Ahmad Khan, Yusufi, Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam, Vol. IV, Lahore 1996, p. 2666.
  12. G.W. Chaudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India, London 1969, p. 4. 
  13. S.M. Ikram, Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan, Lahore 1970, p. 423.
  14. G.W. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 41.
  15. M. Rafique Afzal, Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Lahore 1980, p. 429.
  16. Ibid., p. 428.
  17. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-48, Karachi: Ferozsons Ltd, pp. 29-30.
  18. G.W. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 41.
  19. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, Fereign Policy of Pakistan, Karachi 1964, p. 183.
  20. Government of Pakistan, White Paper on India’s War Propaganda Against Pakistan Cited from Amrit Bazar Patrika, dated August 15, 1947.
  21. The Statesman, New Delhi, August 18, 1947.
  22. Ibid.
  23. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, op.cit., p. 12.
  24. White Paper on India’s War Propaganda Cited from Hindustan Standard, dated September 23, 1948.
  25. Sunday Standard, 26th April, 1959, quoted in S.M. Ikram, op.cit., p. 414.
  26. M.A.H. Ispahani, Quaid-i-Azam as I know him, Karachi 1966, pp. 273-274.
  27. G.W. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 10.
  28. Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, London and New York 1959, p. 377.
  29. M. Rafique Afzal, op.cit., p. 439.
  30. Ibid., p. 438.
  31. The Pakistan Times, March 12, 1948.
  32. The Eastern Times, March 13, 1948.
  33. M. Rafique Afzal, op.cit., p. 440.
  34. G.W. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 42.
  35. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
  36. M.A.H. Ispahani, op.cit., p. 274.
  37. Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, M.A. Jinnah: A Political Study, Lahore 1953
  38. Keith Callard, Pakistan a Political Study, p. 233.
  39. R.M. White, The Great Leader Quaid-i-Azam, p. 92.
  40. The Eastern Times, August 26, 1947.
  41. Lord Ismay, Memoirs, London 1960, p. 436.
  42. G.W. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 43.
  43. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-48, Karachi: Ferozsons Ltd., p. 32.
  44. Nusrat Begum, Indo-Pakistan Relations, Thesis submitted in History Department, Punjab University, Lahore 1968, p. 49.
  45. G.W. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 46.
  46. J.B.Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations, Amsterdam, 1958, p. 223.
  47. G.W. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 47. 
  48. The Dawn, September 22, 1947.
  49. Altaf Gauhar, Twenty Years of Pakistan, 1947-67, Karachi, 1967, p. 671.
  50. J.B. Schectman, Exacuee Property in India and Pakistan, p. 406.
  51. J.B. Das Gupta, op.cit., p. 190.
  52. Ibid,. p. 56.
  53. “Minutes of the Inter-Dominion Conference of 22nd July, 1948”, Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Vol. I, part-I, pp. 285-286.
  54. “Minutes of the Inter-Dominion conference of 22nd July, 1948”, Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Vol. 1, part-1, pp. 285-286.
  55. Ian Stephens, op.cit., p. 215.
  56. Altaf Gauhar, op.cit., p. 662.
  57. The Dawn, January 9, 1948.
  58. The Statesman, January 13, 1948.
  59. The Dawn, 9th January, 1948.
  60. Ibid.
  61. Ch. Muhammad Ali, op.cit., p. 351.
  62. Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, London 1953, p. 249.
  63. G.W. Chaudhury, op.cit., p. 145.
  64. The Pakistan Times, April 28, 1948.
  65. Ibid
  66. Sir Percival Griffiths, Modern India, p. 179.
  67. G.W. Chaudhury, op.cit., p. 145.
  68. The Pakistan Times, April 28, 1948.
  69. Nusrat Begum, op.cit., p. 39.
  70. G.W. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 144.
  71. Richard V. Weekes, Pakistan: Birth and Growth of Muslim Nation, p. 94.
  72. Radicliffe, Punjab Boundary Award, pp. 564-565.
  73. T.M. Dogar, Main Problems of Pakistan, p. 24.            
  74. Ian Stephens, op.cit., p. 275.
  75. Altaf Gauhar, op.cit., p225.
  76. G.W. Chaudhry, op. cit., p. 158.
  77. Ian Stephens, op.cit., p.277.
  78. J.B. das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, Natherlands, 1968, p. 78.
  79. Ibid., p. 427.
  80. Mushtaq Ahamad Gurmani, Kashmir World’s Biggest Question Mark, pp. 13-24.
  81. J.B. Das Gupta, op.cit., p. 79.
  82. J.B. Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan relations, Amsterdam, 1958 p. 60.
  83. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, op.cit., p. 31.         
  84. G. Allana, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: The Story of a Nation, Karachi, 1967, p. 472.
  85. Nusrat Begum, op.cit., p. 80.
  86. J.B. Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan relations, Amterdam, 1958, p. 66.
  87. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, op.cit., p. 32.
  88. G. Allana, op.cit., p.474.
  89. Mir Laik Ali, The Tragedy of Hyderabad, Karachi, 192, p. 90.
  90. Ibid., p. 153-54.
  91. Ibid. p. 156.
  92. Ch. Mohammad Ali, op.cit., p.280.
  93. Aslam Siddique, Pakistan Seeks Security, Lahore, 1960, p. 21.
  94. V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, p. 322.
  95. Sardar Mohammad, Pakistan Affairs, P. 73.
  96. Ibid., p. 70.
  97. Aslam Siddiqui, A Path for Pakistan, Karachi, 1964, p. 55.
  98. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, op. cit., p. 25.
  99. Ian Stephens, op.cit., p. 220.
  100. Lord Birdwood, The Two Nations and Kashmir, London, 1956, p. 50.
  101. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
  102. T.M. Dogar, op.cit., p. 9.
  103. Mah-e-Nao, November 1965, p. 24.  
  104. Ch. Mohammad Ali, op.cit., p. 297.